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A Model of Diffusion in the Production of an Innovation
Summary
This paper is an attempt to explain diffusion inthe production of an
innovation. Diffusion in production is defined asthe increase in number
of producers, or net entry, in the market for a new product.It is to be
distinguished from the more familiar problem in theliterature on technical
change, namely, the diffusion amongproducersin the use of new products and,
hence, of changes in production processes for"old" products (or services).
The empirical results confirm that a simple model —simplein tenus of
number of variables ——issufficient to explain most of diffusion in thepro-
duction of an innovation. The principal variable that explainsdiffusion of
entry is the demonstration effect. The principalvariable that retards entry
is the accumulated experience and goodwill of existingfirms. A limiting
force is the population of potential entrants. None of thesevariables
appears to lend itself readily to influence by publicpolicy.
The first stage in diffusion ——theInterval from first commercial
introduction of the product to entry by competitors ——variesgreatly in
duration. Institutional variables, including public policy, mayhavea greater
impact on the length of this first stage, which is notcovered by this study,
thanonthe diffusion process in the periods examined in this paper.
Michael Gort and AkiraKonakayama
Departmentof Economics
State University of New York at Buffalo
John Lord O'Brian Flail, North Campus
Buffalo, New York 14260
(716) 636—2121,2122This paperisanattempt to explain the process of diffusion in the
productionof an innovation. Diffusion in production is defined as the increase
in number of producers, or net entry, in the market for a new product. It is to
be distinguished from the more familiar problem in the literature on technical
change, namely, the diffusion among producers in the use of new products and,
hence,ofchanges in productionprocesses for "old" products (or services).
Inan earlier paper, Gort and Klepper1 showed that a typical "diffusion in
production" process involves a number of stages. Phase I encompasses the interval
inwhich theoriginal producers of a new product remain without competitors in
the market •PhaseII is the interval from the "take—off" point of net entry to
the timethatnet entry decelerates drastically. Phase III is the ensuing
period of loworzero net entry and PhaseIVis the subsequent period of negative
net entry. Phase V represents the newequilibriumin the numberof producers
thatcoincides with the maturity of the product market andcontinuesuntil some
newfundamentaldisturbance generates a change in market structure. Thepresent
study focuseson the period from roughly the beginning of Stage II until the
peakin number of producers is reached sometime in Stage III. It does not deal
withthesubsequentdevelopmentof what may be considered a mature market,
includingthecharacteristicintervalinwhich the number of producers declines.
Then
For given expected prices and demand, the division of the market between
existing firma and new entrants depends on V, a vector of observed attributes
of th. population of potential entrants, and C, a vector of observed attributes
of the population of earlier entrants (and now existing firms) in the market.
Th. average probability of entry in time tforthe population of potential
entrants can be written as:
Pt —P(G,V)
M.Gortand S. Klepper, "Time Paths in theDiffusionof Product Innovations,"
State University of New York at Buffalo, Economics Department, DiscussionPaper
No. 444.—2—
We assume that the unobserved attributes of individual firms(whichinclude such
facotre as the personalities and biases of managers, chance perceptions of
alternative opportunities, differences in risk aversion, etc.) are randomly
distributed among firms with a con set of observed characteristics.'
Apart from the attributes of existing firma and potential entrants the
expectedreturns to newentrants, discounted for risk, (and, hence4 the entry
rate)will depend upon a) the perceived risks associated with entryand b)the
expectedprofit margin for the most efficient producers. Assuming a market without
entrybarriers and anequilibrium price at which outputis greaterthanzero,the
expected profit margin will depend upon the extent of anytransitorydisequilibrium
between supply anddemand. To be sure, profitmarginswillalso depend upon entry
barriers—thatis, monopoly power. But higher entrybarrierscannot, by definition,
raise the rate of net entry. Consequently, an excess of actual over"normal"
competitive rates of return will raise entry only to the extent thatsuch returns
arise fromdisequilibrium.2
Assumingan absence of entry barriers, we have indicated thatentrywill
depend upon perceived risks, disequilibrium induced deviations between actual
and "normal" competitive profit margins, and the attributes (mainly costs) of
existingfirms and ofthe populationof potential entrants. Before specifying
'Fora given probability of choice taking account of the relevant variables, the
observedgros.number of entrants Laarandom number obeying a binomial distri-
bution. Thisisbecause each firm faces a binary choice of entry or non—entry.
Thes principle applies to gross exits.
2Somsentry barriers are themselves transitory in thesense thatthey generate
incentives that lead to their destruction. Such barriers can also be classified
as sources of transitory disequilibria.—3—
therelevant (and empirically measurable) variables that control each of these
elements, our model must be developed further with respect to the two components
thatgenerate the net entry rate, namely, gross entry and gross exit.
Let N denote the population of potential entrants in the market for a new
product. At time t, the number of potential entrants will then be N —nt—i
where
isthe number thathave already entered——that is, the number of producers
att—i. The numberof expected entrants at time t istherefore:
Ft (N-iii)
(1)
where Ft is the expected number of entrants in t and Pt is the choice probability
of entry at t. Similarly, the expected number of gross exits is:
—xn1
(2)
where is the expected number of gross exits, is the probability of exit
at time t, and nt—i, the number of existing firms, represents the population
from whichexiting firmsaredrawn.Combining equations (1)and (2), we have:
—I'x —
ne_i) x nt—i +u
whereis the actual net entry in t and u is a random number obeyingthe usual
assumptions of regression.'
Our next task is to specify the variables on which the probability of entry
and exit and depend and to indicate an appropriate and measurable proxy
variable for N, the population of potential entrants. In general terme, we have
alreadynotedthatP depends upon disequilibria between supply and delMnd, upon
the perceived risks of entry, and on the attributes (mainly production and marketing
Coats)of existingfirms and of the population of potential entrants. We now turn
to a more concrete specification of these variables.
appearsin the equation since Et isthe observed actual rather than the
unbserved expected net entry.—4—
Acorrect measure of the magnitude of transitory disequilibrium is the
difference between actual price,p and equilibrium, 1'eIn the absence of
such information, we assume that this difference is a function of thegrowth
rate in demand and, hence, output, per firm. That is:
a,t—i. —e,t—i (4)
where the previously undefined symbol(4/fl) isthegrovthrateinoutputperfjq/ti,
1 from
measuredby
(, . Theas8umedfunctioolre1atjonstspart1y/thegestation q
period in creating new capacity andpartlyfrom dynamic adjustment costs. The
latter lead to diseconoinies with high growth and such diseconomiesare assumed
tobe an increasing function of the growth rate.1 Asa result, with a high
growth rate per firm,prices can be expected to rise, thus raisingthe expected
rate of return to entry.
We turn nowto risk. We cannot, of course, measure all the forces that
Influencerisk.However,fora given objective probability distribution of rates
of return to investment in a newproductmarket, the perceived risk to a potential
entrantisafunction of howmanyother firms made successful investmentsin the
samemarket. We characterize thi. asthe"demonstration effect" and assie it to
be a function ofnt—i, the number of existing firms in the market.
If we assumethatentry (or diffusion in use) depends exclusively on the
demonstration effect,ni, andthepopulation of potential entrants (or users),
I,afamiliar model of diffusion emerges. First, consider thecase where cs(t),
'The firstexplicit dEvelopment of a dynamicadjustmentcost theory as applied to
the growth of firms is usually attributed to EPenrose, The Theoryofthe
Growth of the Firm, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1959.—5—
the probability of entry per smallinterval oftime,and 8(t), the probability




where the only previously undefined symbols isn,,the initial number offirms
in the market •Itis clear from the above that the growth path for n(thenumber
of firma in the market) is exponential with an asymptoticmaximum at uN/(cs+8).
Now consider the case where 6(t) is again a constant or zero,but ci(t) is
subjectto the demonstration effect and, therefore, changes overtime so that




whereis the expected net entry per small interval of time, or:
—a*nt(l
— — 8n (6)
where a* —axN.It is clear from the above that if a* >8,we have a logistic
growth path for n with an asymptotic maximum of N(l -8/ac).
The above model, with a demonstration effect and a fixed numberof potential
users (or entrants),isprecisely the model implied in Griliches seminalarticle
1
onth. diffusionofhybrid corn.Our theoretical framework differs in that 8(t)
is not assu.sd to beconstantand (t)dependscritically on variables other than
the demonstration effect and the number of potential users or entrants.
Griliches, "Hybrid Corn: An Exploration in the Economics of Technological
Change," Econometrica, October 1957.Asimilarthoughmorecomplex modelwas
subsequentlypresented inE. Mansfield, "Technological Change and theRateof
Imitation," Econometrica, October 1961.—6—
We have now specified the demonstration effect as controlling perceptions
of risk and we have specified our proxy for transitory disequilibrium.Next,
consider the attributes of existing firms in the market and of thepopulation of
potential entrants. As a simplification, and in the absence ofcontrary informa-
tion, we assume that both sets of firms are drawn from a coimnon universeexcept
with respect to one class of attributes. Existing firms will haveaccumulated
over the period they have been in the market a stock of knowledge andexperience,
of human capital that is not rapidlyreproducible, and of goodwill in the market.
Consequently, they have an advantage over new entrants which is anincreasing
function of the accumulated volume ofpast production (and sales). We approximate
the effect of such accumulated experience byEq1/Zq where Eq_1 is the
accumulated aggregate output from the initial introduction ofthe product to t—l.
It is deflated by the accumulated aggregate output to the end of the
interval covered by our data to permit theuse of pooled cross—section as well
as time—series data.
The effect of accumulated experiencewill, ceteris paribus, steadily increase
over time until it becomes a prohibitive barrier toentry for most firms. However
the faster the rate of technicalchange in production processes or products, the
less is the relevance of past experience forthe future, and the higher the
technical change in products the smaller is the effectof accumulated goodwill.
A proxy for technical change should thereforehave a positive sign in our model.
To conclude the discussion ofgross entry, we specify that the population of
potential entrants, ,isproportional to the number of firms in the host industry
of the product innovation. Implicit inthis is the assumption there are
technological and marketing linkagesamong product markets in the same industry.
It further assumes the size of thepopulation of firms technically equipped to
enter an industry (though not already in it) isrelated to the number of firms—7—
in theindustry. Obviously these assumptions areviewed only as approximations
toreaLity.Howgoodsuch approximations are is an empiricalquestionas is our
compromisewith theory in defining the boundaries of industries in accordance
withthe 4—digit SIC classification.
Turning now to theprobability of exit, we must once again, in the
context of limited information, start with simplifying assumptions. Specifically,
we start with the premise that existing firms have valid engineering forecasts
of their costs, and that the principal surprises and disappointment. leading to
exitresultf rain errors in forecasting prices and market demand (or output).
Obviously, there will be instances of exit arising from uniquehistorical cir-
cumstances such as the retirement of anowner-manager, or the inability of some
firms toproduce a product that appeals to end users. But how importantthese
special circumstances are is an empirical question to be tested indirectly by
the adequacy of the general variables as explanations of the relevant phenomenon.
To test our hypotheses on exit, we employed a method first developed by Solow.1
$a].y,weconstructed a number of hypothetical series of expected output and
pric, by the model of adaptive expectations. The model specifies that
•+ A(x—x)wherexand are, respectively, the expected and the
actual values ofthevariable under consideration at time t,andA is the speed
ofadjustment with values between zero and one. For a given A, a time series of
theexpected output andprice can be constructed by iteration, starting with a
singl. initialvalueand using the observed time series of output and price as
elements. We created hypothetical time series of the expected output and price
for A —0.1,0.5 and 0.9, representing a slow, moderate,and fast adjustment process.
1R.M. Solow, Price Expectations and the Behavior of the Price Level, Manchester
University Press, 1969.—8—
Assuming thatthe expected andactual valuesare the sameatsome imitial point
in time, a time series of error rates in expectations canbegenerated,
t—L,2,...,T,based on the differences between the actual and
expected values.
Using the timeseriesof error rates in expectations of output andprice,
we took two—year averages of the error rates in expectations as well as the
annual estimates. This was done partly because of the arbitrariness of a one—
year interval in assessing the effects of disappointments and surprises on exit
decisions, but partly also to differentiate between immediate (short—run) and
lagged (long—run)effects. Accordingly we used q for output (or p for price)
and foroutput (or for price) in our equation where q (or p) is the
fl*.4.dj*
—'t—l't—2
current year error rate in expectations of output (or price) and 2
(or t_i —
Beforeturning to empirical tests, a review of some of the economic issues
raisedby our model maybehelpful. First, canageneral model devoid of the
imiqueinstitutional aspects of each product market explainthe observed pheno—
menon? For example, we have said nothing about the role of a small number of
critical patents as entry barriers even though patents are commonly believed to
have had a role in some ofthe product markets with which we dealt. Second,
though diseconomie.ofscale have often been proposed by economists as
eiplanationaforentry instead offaster growth by existing firms,we have
excluded thisvariable from our model. Since th. average siza of firm normally
continues to growlongafter net entry approaches zero, diseconomies of scale
areviable explanations of the history of diffusion in production only if special
assumptions are made about shifts over timein the minimum and maximum efficient
sizeof firms. Suchassumptions tend to be ad hoc andaredifficult to fit into
a generalmodel.—9—
A third basic issue is our assumption that there is a definable and
measurable population of potential entrants as distinct from the universe of
businessfirms. And finally,there is the question of the powerof several
variables,in terms of their effect on entry.In particular, what isthe
influence of the demonstration effect, of accumulated experience andgoodwill,
and of dynamicadjustmentcosts?
Estimation Procedure
The estimating procedure that was appropriate differed from ordinaryleast
squaresbecause of the need to imposeinequalityconstraints on the parameters.
Since the probability of entry or of exit cannot be less than zero or greater
than 1, andsinceOLS estimates do not guarantee parameters that fallwithin
these limits, a constraint needs to be imposed. The imposition of constraints,
as the section on statistical results will show,considerablyimproved our
resultsin termsof consistencyof estimates with theory.
Wemay specifyour modelforEt, actualnetentry,asfollows:







(j—l2,...,L) is an explanatory variable of the probability of entry at
time t or (ju"2+l,...g) is an explanatory variable of the probability
ofexitat time t, orOs
are parameters associated with the explanatory
variables,
xj's.






nt—1 E wii:040 (9)—10—
We assume that the error term u satisfies the usual Gauss—Markov
conditions.The above procedure can be formulated as a quadratic
programming problem and solved by a finite computational routine such as the
Lemke algorithm. The resulting estimates of 0 will be asymptotically unbiased,
consistent, andefficient,provided the specification is correct •
Data
The sample of product innovations was selected from a set of forty—six
product histories developed in connection with a related researchproject.2 Of
the forty—six, only six had data on output, prices, number of firms, and
patents, over the entire period necessary for our analysis.
Our method of analysis involves tKe pooling of cross—section andtime—seriesdata
so that complete, or almost complete, histories were essential.
Information on number of firma was obtained from Thomas'Registerof American
Manufactures,. supplemented by correspondence with industry experts andbya
variety of other trade sources.Annual dataon the numberofpatents issued for
each product were obtained from the United States Patent Office. Data on prices
and output were derived from a variety of government and private sources,
including trade publications and information provided by companies in the relevant
product markets. Counts of product and process improvements subsequent to the
initial introduction of each of the six products were also derived from a wide
variety of published and unpublished sources, including product histories
provided by individual companies. N wasbased on data from the Census of Manufac-
tures for 1947, 1954, 1958, and 1963.
1For an extensive discussion of inequality constrained least—squares estimation,
see Chong Kiev Liew, "Inequality Constrained Least—Square Estimation", Journal of
the AmericanStatisticalAssociation, September 1976.
2See M. Gort and S. Kiepper, p. cit.—11—
As previously noted, the period chosen for each of the six products,
encompassed the interval from take—off in entry or the time when the complete
data became available to the time when the number of firms in the market reached
itshistorical peak. The products and relevant time intervals are listed below.
1. DDT, 1944—52 (9 years)




6. Cathode ray tubes, 1948—1959 (12 years)
Results
Table1 sumearizes theprincipalstatistical results. The equationtested







numberof existing firmsin t—1
accumulatedoutput to t—1 divided by the accumulated
output at the end of the period studies
• the number of patents issuedint—l
—thenumberof product and production process improvements
recorded in t—1





Regression Coefficients, t—statistics andcorrelationsfor
explanations of net entry1
OLS2 ICLS3 OLS2 ICLS3 OLS2 ICLS3 OLS2 ICLS3
0.0321 0.0276 0.0275 0.0268 0.0379 0.0321 0.0328 0.0312 0 (3.306) (2.801) (3.231) (3.333) (2.957) (2.794) (2.894)
0.0005 0.0008 0.0005 0.0008 0.0004 0.0008 0.0004 0.0008 1
(2.311) (6.155) (2.471) (6.547) (1.968) (6.070) (2.161) (6.466)
—0.0061 —0.0056—0.0054—0.0054 -0.0047—0.0050 —0.0039 —0.0049
(—1.673) (—1.754) (—1.463) (—1.749) (—1.239) (—1.896) (—1.001) (—1.880)
—0.0518—0.0411—0.0474 —0.0402—0.0611 —0.0499—0.0585 —0.0492.....
(—2.731) (—4.021) (—2.499) (—3.970) (—2.463) (—4.718) (—2.373) (—4.771)




8o—0.0222 0.0943 0.0328 0.1040—0.0372 0.0905 0.0210 0.1001
(—0.3754) (4.474)(0.4764) (4.710) (—0.6130) (4.358)(0.2993) (4.589)
—0.0104 0.0084 0.0019 0.0080 ——
(—0.1550)(1.630) (0.0269) (1.579)
82—0.1964—0.1238—0.1836—0.1331—0.1978 —0.l'i92—0.1866—0.1283
(—3.847) (—3.766) (—3.497) (—4.122) (—3.838) (—3.622) (—3.492) (—3.970)
8 0.3048 0.0778 0.3096 0.0749 ——
(1.644) (4.672) (1.662) (4.569)
84 —0.8638 —0.9269—0.5966—0.9113—0.7911—0.8808 —0.5197—0.8734
(—2.487) (—2.468) (—1.439) (—2.533)(—2.030)(—2.397) (—1.237) (—2.475)
0.7548 0.7637 0.7608 0.7697
j2 0.7214 0.7187 0.7152 0.7121
1The symbols are identified in thetext in the discussion of equation(10).t—
statisticsare ehvn inparenthese.a. A dash signifies that the variables was excluded
in the specific version of the equation. The speed of,djuatment coefficients A,
was .5 for expected outputand .9 forexpected price. I'isthe correlation adjusted
fordegrees of freedom.
2ordinaryleast squares estimation.
3lnequality constrained least squares estimation.—13—
t—1
—theaverage rate of expectation error in output int—2and t—l
pt_pr —therate of expectation error in price in timet () t t
tl
—theaveragerate of expectation error in price int—2 and t-l
—thepopulation of potential entrants in tine t-11
Table 1 shows that our hypotheses with respect to the role of the demonstration
effect (the coefficient Qandtheaccumulated experience andgoodwill(a2) are
strongly confirmedas judged both by thesigns of thecoefficients and the t
statistic. Theelasticitiesmeasured at the means, andaveragedfor thesix
products2are quite high. A onepercentincrease in the variable that measures
the demonstration effect leads to a 1.87 percent increase in entry. A one percent
increase in the variable that measures accumulated experience leads to a 2.88
percent decrease in entry.
Our assumption thatthepopulation of potential entrants canbe roughly
approximated by 1t-l' N_1 is measured by the number of firms in the host
induetry, is also strongly confirmed. An alternative specification in which the
size of the populationofpotential entrants was assumed to equal 21t_l -nt—i
reduced R2 materially.
Ourresults indicate alsothat n_1effectively measures th.population of
potential exits •Itappears unnecessary to distinguish between earlierand
later entrants—thatis, to devise a measure that takes account of theextent
towhichn_1 consists of recent or of old entrants—in measuringpotential
1Any pointin timeprecedinga censusyear was given the value oftheObservation
for the previous census year.
-
2Sincethe absolute valuesof therelevantver4.'!'.._acrossthe sixproducts,
the elasticities vary accordingly.—14-.
grossexit. Disappointments in output and in price expectations came through as
strong explanatory variables and with the correct signs for the lagged variables.
Our beet results were with a moderate speed of adjustment coefficient ,X—.5,
for errors in output expectations and a much faster adjustment, A —.9,for
errors in price expectations. The reversal of signs on current and lagged errors
in expectations is, a priori, plausible. Greater expected than realized values
reflect optimism and, in the short run, should not lead to exit. It takes time
for disappointments to take their effect on decisions to leave the market.
Among the negative results, dynamic adjustment costs leading to disequilibria——
at least to the extent that this variable can be measured by the growth rate in
output per firm——did not have a statistically significant effect on entry.
Neither did the proxies for rate of technical. change. In the case of the
annual volume of patenting, the deficiency is in the choice of proxy. The number
ofpatents does not capturetechnological change for two reasons: first, impor-
tant patents are not distinguished from trivialones and, second, itisin any
event an indexof the Input of innovative effort rather than of the output of
innovations.We employed this proxy only because It hasbeen widely used In
economicliterature (we believe, incorrectly) as an index of technicalchange.
Our second index of technical change, the number of product and production
process Improvementsfailed to contribute to explaining the phenomenonperhaps
becausetheinformation is toothin to be ueed in the context of a modeltested
againstannual data. Too many of the annual observations were zeros.
'The results obtained by M. Cort and S.Kiepper, .cit.,show that if the
entry history is decomposed into stages each consisting of a number of years, the
frequency of product and production process innovations is much higher during
periods of high than of low entry.-15—
The positive results appear to be quite robust in the sense thatminor
changes in either the list of variables (as indicatedinTable 1) or the choice
of a lag (to conserve space, results using alternative lags are not shown) do
notmarkedly change th. a's and 8's.Similarly, the use of alternative speed
of adjustment coefficients for expectation errors, while it reduces the R2, does
not, in moat instances, change the signs or the statistical significance of the
key variables. In contrast,if inequality constrained least squares is sub-
stitutedby ordinary least squares estimation——a procedure we have indicated is
inappropriate——the results are materially affected.
Pinally, a question might be raised whether, because of unidentified
structural changes, net entry declines simply as the time approaches the point
at which the number ofproducers is at a historical peak. Using T as the
symbolfor that point, we added T—t to the list of variables in the model
specified by equation (10). Theadditional variable contributed nothing to
explainingnet entry and, in fact, R2 adjusted for degrees of freedom declined.
Conclusions
-
Theempirical results confirm that a simple model—simple in terms of
number of variables——is sufficient to explain most of the phenomenon of diffusion
in the production of an innovation. The principal variable that explains
diffusion of entry is the demonstration effect. The principal variable that
retards entry and finally brings it to an end is the accumulated experience and
goodwill of existing firms, operating as a barrier to entry. A limiting force
is the population of potential entrants approximated by the number of firms in
the host industry of a product innovation (minus, of course, the number that
have already entered). None of these variables appears to lend itself readily
to influence by public policy.—16-
Our study begins with the point in time correspondingto entry by the
firstcompetitors of theinitial innovators. The first stage——the interval
fromfirst commercial introduction of the product to entrybycompetitors—
varies greatly in duration. It maywell bethat institutional variables,
including public policy, have a greater impact onthe length of thisfirst
stage than onthe diffusion processinthe periods icmined in this paper.—17—
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